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Brest: The Alternative Dispute Resolution Grab Bag: Complementary Curric

THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION GRAB BAG:
COMPLEMENTARY CURRICULUM, COLLABORATION,
AND THE PERVASIVE METHOD
Paul Brest*
Rather than report on any specific activity at Stanford, let me comment
on several issues raised during the Symposium.
The first concerns skills, in addition to the core analytic, legal research,
and writing skills, that are useful for a wide variety of law practices. I put
together a bunch of these under the heading of "complementary
curriculum"-without the pretense of its having any intellectual
coherence. Rather, it is a grab bag, responsive to what everyone on the
panel has implicitly said: that a client comes to a lawyer, typically, not to
find out what the law is, but because he or she has a problem and senses
that the law has something to do with it. (Otherwise the client might go to
an accountant or a psychiatrist or a physician.) The core of the
complementary curriculum focuses on the skills, attitudes, and values
necessary to be a problem solver for the client-that is, to understand the
client's problem, to analyze its legal aspects, and work with the client to
solve the problem, taking into account its legal aspects. Quite often, the
legal problem largely disappears, and the lawyer still plays an important
role in counseling the client.
So what are those skills and bodies of knowledge? The ones that are
most familiar to all of us include interviewing and counseling, negotiation,
and mediation. Though not discussed by the panelists, litigation is
obviously important as well. A skill that may get somewhat less attention
is planning. Lawyers spend a lot of time planning, and this can be learned.
The same is true of creativity.
Let me mention another skill about which I have become evangelical:
collaboration. Watching my son go through a J.D.-M.B.A. program made
me aware of some comparative strengths and weaknesses of law and
business schools. The analytic skills that every law school teaches from the
first day would be very useful in business and nearly every other
profession. At the same time, we could learn from business schools'
emphasis on collaboration. From day one, MBA students are involved in
collaborative projects. MBA students do almost everything in teams. While
our students work collaboratively onjournals and in some clinical courses,
they generally work in isolation. Collaboration is a skill that can be
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learned. Many of us do not come by it naturally. To teach it properly, one
must be attentive to group process. One must deal with the group dynamics
when those dynamics do not work quite as well as they should.
Also in my grab bag are some bodies of knowledge that may be useful
across a range of our graduates' careers. Game theory, transaction cost
economics, and cognitive psychology are areas of growth in legal
scholarship. The interesting question is how relevant they are to teaching
our students lawyering skills such as counseling, negotiation, and
mediation. My own view is that important insights can be learned. It
remains to be seen, however, just how broadly or deeply relevant the
theories are.
I would also like to comment on the pedagogy of the pervasive
method-particularly in the first year-whether used to teach ethics, ADR,
or any other subject. There is a tremendous appeal to doing everything in
the first year because that is when you have the students' greatest attention.
In some cases, the pervasive method really works. The symposium
participants have related success stories and some of you may have them
from your own experience.
However, Professor Katheryn Dutenhaver made a point about one
limitation which bears emphasis. You take the faculty as you find them.2
Let me illustrate this from Stanford's experience in trying to integrate
ethics into first year courses. As you may know, Deborah Rhode of our
faculty is the author of a book on ethics by the pervasive method3 that
offers ethical problems for different courses. (It is dedicated to me because
she claims that I coerced her to write it.) We tried it in the first year and it
proved Professor Dutenhaver's point about taking the faculty as you find
them.
If a professor does not want to teach ethics as part of his or her torts or
criminal law or constitutional law course, the ways of subverting it are
myriad. There is no worse message you can give to students than one
faculty member did when he announced: "Here comes the sermon." Part
of it is just obstinance. One of the things that leads us to become law
professors is that we value autonomy. But I think there is a point that goes
beyond obstinacy or autonomy. There are two reasons that faculty may be
uncomfortable in doing pervasive this or that. One, which I think is true of
ADR as well as ethics, is that to take something seriously as an intellectual
subject means getting a command of a quite substantial body of
knowledge, which is every bit as complex, every bit as analytically
demanding, as knowing contracts, property, or torts. One can understand
2. See Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Dispute Resolution and its Purpose in the Curriculumof
DePaulUniversity College of Law, 50 FLA. L. REV. 719,729 (1998).
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a faculty member who says that to teach several hours of ethics or dispute
resolution in a first year course requires developing a command over a new
body of materials. In some sense, the more seriously we take a subject, the
more we should wonderabout asking somebody to do a snippet in the first
year course. That is the shallowness point that Professor Lea Vaughn
made.
And there is also a pedagogic point that Professor Ron Pipkin made:
that the pedagogies we use in dispute resolution require skills unfamiliar
to many law professors.5 Teaching through simulation seems a risky
endeavor for many instructors. It takes a lot of work. It requires some
courage for a faculty member who likes the distance between himself or
herself and the students that the typical law school classroom offers. Not
everyone has that courage and those skills.
Doing things pervasively is a wonderful idea, but there are some very
real limits, which may explain some of the frustrations of those who would
like to see issues of ethics, issues of dispute resolution, and other subjects
integrated into substantive courses. Maybe not everything can be stuffed
into the first year curriculum.

4. See Lea B. Vaughn, Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) into the
Curriculumat the Universityof Washington School ofLaw: A Reportand Reflections, 50 FLA. L.
REv. 679, 699-700 (1998).
5. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Teaching DisputeResolution in the FirstYear of Law School: An
Evaluationof the Programat the University of Missouri-Columbia,50 FLA. L. REV. 610, 613-14
(1998).
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